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EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL:  
MOVING PAST ZERO-SUM NOTIONS OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO PROMOTE BOTH 
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 
Stephen Engel*  
JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 288. HARDCOVER $38.95. 
PAPERBACK $31.95. 
The concept of equal opportunity—at least as expressed in U.S. legal contexts—
perhaps gains its most common expression in affirmative action policy and jurisprudence. 
Court decisions and popular discourse have framed attempts to promote equal opportunity 
as a zero-sum endeavor. For example, upon hearing that the Supreme Court upheld the 
University of Texas’ admission policy in 2016,1 Abigail Fisher, who claimed that she had 
been denied the opportunity to attend that institution because of her race, said, “I am 
disappointed that the Supreme Court has ruled that students applying to the University of 
Texas can be treated differently because of their race or ethnicity . . . . I hope that the nation 
will one day move beyond affirmative action.”2 By contrast, the University of Texas 
maintained that its policy promoted opportunity and denied the zero-sum calculus put 
forward by the plaintiff:  
Ensuring a diversity of backgrounds within—as well as among—racial groups is 
one of the best ways to help breakdown racial stereotypes and promote cross-racial 
understanding, and it underscores that the consideration of race truly is 
individualized and not based on stereotypes. The point is not to favor applicants 
with any particular background, but to promote diversity by admitting 
individuals—of all races—from different backgrounds.3  
                                                 
*   Stephen M. Engel is Associate Professor and Chair of Politics at Bates College as well as an Affiliated 
Scholar of the American Bar Foundation. He most recently authored Fragmented Citizens: The Changing 
Landscape of Gay and Lesbian Lives (New York University Press 2016).  
 1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 2. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds University of Texas Affirmative Action Admissions, WASH. POST 
(June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-upholds-university-of-
texas-affirmative-action-admissions/2016/06/23/513bcc10-394d-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html. 
 3. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23–24, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/No-14-
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One side of the debate viewed the affirmative action in higher education admissions 
as denying opportunity; the other side contended it promotes opportunity, although this 
position is carefully articulated so that the opportunity is not framed as a compensatory 
remedy for histories of discrimination. Instead, the educational benefits that flow from a 
diverse student body provide opportunity for all. 
In his beautifully written, systematically argued, and highly original book, 
Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity, political and legal theorist Joseph 
Fishkin cuts through this static, if not stagnant, debate that continues to preoccupy and 
limit our popular and legal understandings of equality. With passion, Fishkin writes:  
[I]t is time to move beyond the assumptions that all are locked in zero-sum struggles 
for scarce positions, where anyone’s gain is someone else’s loss . . . . [T]his book 
is a call to move beyond that familiar political terrain—a terrain littered with the 
detritus of the affirmative action wars—that assumes such zero-sum struggles are 
an exogenous fact about the world, unaffected by our institutional and policy 
choices.
4 
 
Instead, inequality is very much a consequence of both intentional policy decisions 
and the unexpected or unintended consequences of our decisions. As such, we should feel 
empowered and compelled to explore how we can redirect our actions. The book carries 
through on this charge by laying out numerous policy areas in which Fishkin’s ideal of 
opportunity pluralism can be realized.5 
Fishkin posits that our attempts to promote equality are flawed in at least three ways. 
First, they are myopic in so far as they are cabined to particular policy domains. Because 
the concept of equal opportunity can be so vast, we often approach it by examining how it 
might work out in a particular domain, such as employment or college admissions. Yet 
doing so engenders multiple problems, not least of which is the flawed notion of 
considering equality a meritocratic notion rather than a developmental one.6 
Second, and relatedly, common understandings and approaches to equal opportunity 
are myopic inasmuch as they are restricted to particular points in the life cycle.7 This is 
made manifest in two ways. We tend to focus on points where access is constrained, like 
entrance exams such as the SAT or ACT, and we create policies for overcoming systemic 
bias in those exams rather than focus our attention on understanding (and countering) how 
those exam outcomes are manifestations of broad and deep institutionalized inequality or 
why and how we have decided that these exams themselves are indicators of “objective 
merit.” Additionally, because we focus on the singular points in time where opportunities 
are deliberately constrained, we fail to see how opportunities accumulate and compound 
over time such that “in the context of the larger opportunity structure, the outcome of every 
competition is the input for the next competition.”8 In other words, Fishkin advocates that 
we see how opportunity is developmental. Opportunities not only give people a chance, 
                                                 
981-Brief-in-Opposition.pdf. 
 4. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 23 (2014). 
 5. Id. at ch. 4. 
 6. Id. at 8–9, 83–129. 
 7. Throughout the text, Fishkin refers to the “big test” society (e.g., a college entrance exam). Id. at 13. 
 8. Id. at 5. 
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and equal opportunity is a value not only because we are normatively committed to the 
concept that people should not be unfairly judged or positioned at a deficit ex ante. Rather, 
opportunities or the lack thereof shape who we are and who we conceptualize we can 
become: “Opportunities matter not only because they affect how high each person reaches 
on some scale of success, but also because they affect the different kinds of mental and 
physical capacities and talents a person develops, the ambitions she forms, and the kinds 
of success she seeks.”9 
Third, too often policy attempts to promote equality direct attention to the 
beneficiaries of policies rather than channel our focus on how to grapple with and 
potentially dismantle the inhibiting structures that foster inequality. Our current approach 
to higher education admissions, for example, even as it emphasizes the educational 
benefits of diversity, is too susceptible to charges of “reverse” discrimination and zero-
sum competition. Fishkin maintains that his alternative approach “is not about channeling 
benefits exclusively to the most disadvantaged; rather, it is about altering the shape of the 
opportunity structure to make it more pluralistic.”10 By focusing on the overall structure 
of why opportunities may be experienced as so limited we redirect our analysis and 
application away from “group-based inequality” and toward whether a barrier is “arbitrary 
and unnecessary.”11 
Fishkin builds upon but ultimately rejects the premise of normative equality 
theorists, including Rawls and Dworkin among others.12 Perhaps in the tradition of 
political theorist Gerald MacCallum, who pushed the analysis of liberty by considering the 
ubiquitous negative/positive bifurcation to be a fundamental category mistake and instead 
argued that at stake was less the object to which the freedom was directed, i.e., a right to 
or a freedom from something, and more so the context in which a freedom could be 
exercised, Fishkin reorients the foundational concept of equality of opportunity itself.13 
For Fishkin, at stake is less trying to guarantee some absolute measure of equal treatment 
for a particular group, and more so attempting, in pragmatic fashion, to provide as much 
developmental opportunity to lessen systemic inequality. The goal is not to derive some 
ideal state of equality, but instead to recognize how the individual is always already 
embedded in a matrix of structures, how these structures construct the individual’s sense 
of self, and thus explore how best to open these structures as much as possible so that “the 
full richness of the different, incommensurable goals that people might formulate for 
themselves” is maximized.14   
Fishkin admits in his introduction, “Opening up a broader range of opportunities to 
everyone is not the same thing as making opportunities equal.”15 But he nevertheless 
suggests that his notion of “opportunity pluralism” provides a “powerful lens through 
                                                 
 9. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 88. 
 10. Id. at 211–12. 
 11. Id. at 212. 
 12. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 
(2002); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
 13. Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, in 4 PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: 
174–93 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972).  
 14. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 11. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
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which to view the entire set of problems of social justice with which egalitarians and 
advocates of equal opportunity are concerned.”16 The overarching aim of the book is to 
identify how and where bottlenecks, or “a narrow place in the opportunity structure 
through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a range of valued goals,” 
exist, and to assess whether and how policies can be created that either open them or enable 
people to have the resources to circumvent them.17 And, to challenge the critique that all 
this is purely thought experiments and idealistic thinking, Fishkin highlights how the very 
ideas he promotes are at the core of some of most cited legal precedents – particularly with 
repeated reference to Griggs v. Duke Power Company.18 In short, his recommendations 
could feasibly follow from our existing jurisprudential traditions and political culture. 
The innovative emphasis on opportunity structure coupled with a pragmatic 
approach to lessening or circumventing bottlenecks enables Fishkin to move past the 
notion that equality and freedom may not reinforce one another, but that instead these two 
ideals could work against one another.19 In many ways, Fishkin’s focus on opportunity 
seems to tilt in favor of freedom and against equality, which he acknowledges at the very 
beginning of his analysis: “although we are talking about opportunities, equality seems to 
have dropped out of the equation.”20 But, by zeroing in on why and how we have created 
different kinds of bottlenecks – developmental bottlenecks, resource bottlenecks – Fishkin 
contends that maximizing opportunity has the effect of broadening access, which is a form 
of equalization. 
By highlighting the importance of establishing policies to maximize opportunity and 
reduce or bypass bottlenecks, Fishkin clearly builds on existing scholarship in the 
normative and policy literature on equality that emphasizes capacity or capability. 
Fishkin’s analysis aligns with Van Parijs’s endorsement of real freedom for all, defined as 
having the means to do what one might want to do and explicitly focused on freedom as 
restricted by a lack of means or opportunity.21 Furthermore, Fishkin’s reorientation toward 
the opportunity structure, i.e., the matrix of conditions that determine the extent to which 
we can exercise any ability to see and act on an opportunity, toward a critique that parallels 
Sen’s discussion of equality in which welfare is not just a measure of redistributed goods, 
but a measure of the capacity to achieve ends or freedom to pursue well-being.22 A much 
more activist state follows from this conception.   
For example, if freedom depends on creating a more meaningful set of options, then 
we must consider how best we can create real opportunity. Ackerman and Alstott’s 
stakeholder society model, which provides citizens with a one-time lump sum dollar 
amount “stake” upon graduating from high school is one policy attempt to make options 
                                                 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 13. 
 18. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 19. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, 
eds., trans., 2000); Ronald Dworkin, Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog’s Approach, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (2001). 
 20. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 21. See PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL (1995). 
 22. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 194–95 (discussing 
Sen’s approach). 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/14
ENGEL, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (241) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2018  8:46 AM 
2018 BOTTLENECKS 245 
more accessible and enhance freedom.23 Roemer’s model, which Fishkin directly 
evaluates and which provides compensation within group “types” such that inequality 
within type could be accepted as ambition-sensitive, while inequality across type would 
demand compensation, is another policy recommendation to increase the meaningful 
options among which individuals can choose thereby enhancing their freedom.24 
Indeed, Fishkin’s analysis was particularly trenchant insofar as I read it during 
ongoing discussion of Republican attempts to repeal and (possibly?) replace the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). It would seem that if the opportunity pluralism that Fishkin 
advocates is to be realized, then we must create policies that enable people to seize 
opportunities, to take risks, and to not be kept from potential ways of being because some 
unnecessary barrier blocks their path. Indeed, it would seem that tethering health insurance 
to employment is one such bottleneck that Fishkin indicates could be targeted and that the 
ACA did so, in part, to unleash entrepreneurial potential. In our current political climate, 
Fishkin’s normative theory acquires acute policy relevance:  
A society trying to promote opportunity pluralism would attempt to build the kind 
of social safety net that enables individuals to choose riskier paths—such as quitting 
a job to start a new business—and more broadly, that enables individuals to 
formulate goals and choose their paths in life on the basis of pluralistic criteria, not 
simply a need for money or other such instrumental goods.25 
Fishkin’s elegant argument is a strong reminder, given the shallowness of our current 
political discourse, that government provision can promote freedom. 
Finally, Fishkin attempts to illustrate how his normative recommendations are in 
line with and build upon a jurisprudential tradition that exists; in so doing, he reveals the 
potential for pragmatic realization of his vision. Indeed, he suggests that current anti-
discrimination jurisprudence is simply a subset of his broader anti-bottleneck principle. 
Here, he perhaps over-relies on Griggs, and the argument could have been strengthened 
by pointing to a larger range of cases. Fishkin contends that the anti-bottleneck approach 
moves our analysis past the thorny issue of group-based identity politics that often is part 
of the doctrine of scrutiny.26 He writes that we should care about inequality and 
consequent subordination precisely because  
it shapes and limits individual opportunities . . . . But in the end, in a more 
fundamental way than each of us is a member of any group, we are all individual 
human beings. A strong reason to care about group subordination is because it 
                                                 
 23. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999). 
 24. See JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998); FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 61–64 (discussing 
Roemer’s model). 
 25. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 19. Discussing social welfare, such as unemployment insurance, Fishkin writes: 
They make the overall opportunity structure more flexible and pluralistic by decreasing the extent to 
which employees need to fear the immediate consequences of unemployment. This affects incentives: 
It makes people more able to say “I quit,” to change jobs, to take a less secure job . . . or even to start 
a new enterprise . . . . [A] lack of social insurance results in immobility: the phenomenon that is 
sometimes called “job lock” . . . . [P]rovisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“Obamacare”) may finally offer a more effective solution. 
Id. at 220–21. 
 26. See also SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: LEGAL EQUALITY WITHOUT 
IDENTITY (2013). 
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affects actual human beings—not because the group itself, somehow divorced from 
its members, experience injustice.27 
 This claim resonates with some of the most recent Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence of dignity as developed in the LGBT rights and same-sex marriage Supreme 
Court rulings, but it also does not totally negate the importance of class-status as perhaps 
Justice Kennedy’s rulings do inasmuch as they shy away from traditional scrutiny 
analysis.28 Nevertheless, I was left wondering to what extent Fishkin’s anti-bottleneck 
principle is grounded in a concept of human dignity that can prove to be both normatively 
and legally problematic, even as it is increasingly endorsed in constitutional jurisprudence 
around the globe.29 
                                                 
 27. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 245. 
 28. See, for example, Justice Kennedy’s refusal to employ traditional suspect class and strict scrutiny analysis 
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), and Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 29. See, e.g., STEPHEN ENGEL, FRAGMENTED CITIZENS: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GAY AND LESBIAN 
LIVES (2016); Stephen Engel & Timothy Lyle, Fucking with Dignity: Public Sex, Queer Intimate Kinship, and 
How the AIDS Epidemic Bathhouse Closures Constituted a Dignity Taking, CHI. KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018); AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
(2015). 
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